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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 607: WHO MAY IMPEACH
Federal Rule of Evidence 607 states:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party.
including the party calling the witness.'
The underlying policy behind Rule 607 is that the impeachment
of a witness' credibility is essential to bring out the truth of a
matter in a particular case. 2 Hence, under Rule 607 one may
attack the credibility of any witness, including one's own
witness. 3 Moreover, "the right to impeach one's own witnesses
4
[under Rule 607 is] without special restriction."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recently clarified Rule 607 in United States v. Rosa. 5 In Rosa.
the court held that the district court erred in not allowing defense
counsel the opportunity to impeach the credibility of their own
witness. 6 The court found that the trial court's ruling conflicted
7
with Rule 607.
In another recent Second Circuit case, United States v. Eisen.8
the prosecution called hostile witnesses to give testimony, which
was the "affirmative proof ... necessary to construct [their]
case," and then attempted to impeach the witnesses. 9 The court
1. FED. R. Evil. 607.
2. See FED R. EVID. 607 advisory committee's note (denying a part\ the
right to impeach a witness' credibility "leaves the part\ at the merc. kt the
witness and the adversar").
3. FED. R. EVID. 607.
4. United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939. 947 t2d Cir.). cent. dented.
449 U.S. 835 (1980). See also United States v. Freeman. 302 F.2d 347, 351
(2d Cir. 1962) (holding that the impeachment rule should not be limited to
cases in which the witness "is an 'adverse party' or 'hostile'"). cert. dented.
375 U.S. 958 (1963).
5. 11 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied. 114 S. Ct. 1565 t1994).
Five defendants appealed their convictions for various offenses including
narcotics distribution, firearms sales and possession and racketeering, hi. it
323-25.
6. Id. at 336-37.
7. Id. at 337.
8. 974 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1992). cert. denied. 113 S. Ct. 1840 119931,
9. Id. at 263.
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held that under Rule 607, the prosecution "was entitled to
question these witnesses and to invite the jury to disbelieve that
portion of their accounts that contradicted the prosecution's
theory of the case." 10 One caveat to the evidentiary holding in
Eisen is that the strategy of eliciting positive testimony followed
by damaging testimony and impeachment "makes sense ...

only

where the jury can separate the question of the credibility of the
witness on the positive testimony from [the witness'] credibility
on the negative testimony." 11
It should be noted that this distinction can be a subtle one. For
example, in United States v. Webster,12 the defendant argued that
the prosecution presented inadmissible hearsay evidence by
intentionally calling a hostile witness and then using that witness'
out of court statements for purposes of impeachment. 13 The court
held, however, that the prosecution had not acted in bad faith
because a voir dire of the witness had been requested and, as a
result of the defendant's objection, was denied. 14 In agreement

with the application of a good faith standard, the court stated that
"it would be an abuse of [Rule 607] ... for the prosecution to

call a witness that it knew would not give useful evidence, just so
it could introduce hearsay evidence against the defendant in the
hope that the jury would miss the subtle distinction between
impeachment and substantive evidence .
"...,,15
Therefore,
Webster suggests that a good faith standard should be adhered to
when impeachment is sought under Rule 607.
In contrast to Federal Rule 607, the right to impeach one's own
witness in New York is more restrictive. In a criminal case,
under New York Criminal Procedure Law [hereinafter C.P.L.]
10. Id.
11. 27 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6093, at 503 n.28 (1990).
12. 734 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984).
13. Id. at 1192.
14. Id. at 1192-93.
15. Id. at 1192. "Impeachment by prior inconsistent statement may not be
permitted where employed as a mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence
not otherwise admissible." Id. (quoting United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d
183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975)).
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section 60.35, a party may impeach its own witness when the
witness gives testimony that "tends to disprove the position" of

that party. 16 Recently, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Second Department, held that the "tends to disprove"
requirement is met when the witness' testimony "affirmatively
damages" the position of the party. 17 This rule prohibits
admitting evidence of prior contradictory statements "for the
purpose of refreshing the recollection of the witness in a manner

that discloses its contents to the trier of the facts [when the]
witness' testimony does not tend to disprove the position of the
party who called" the witness. 18 In addition, the evidence
- 16. N.Y. Ciu,. PROC. LAW § 60.35(1) (McKinney 1992). Section
60.35(1) provides:
When, upon examination by the party who called him, a witness in a
criminal proceeding gives testimony upon a material issue of the case
which tends to disprove the position of such party, such party may
introduce evidence that such witness has previously made either a
written statement signed by him or an oral statement under oath
contradictory to such testimony.
Id.
17. People v. Mercado, 162 A.D.2d 722, 723, 557 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (2d
Dep't 1990), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 841, 568 N.E.2d 659, 567 N.Y.S.2d
210 (1991). In Mercado, the court stated that "when the People call a witness
who gives testimony at trial upon a material issue which tends to disprove the
People's position at trial, they may introduce prior written signed statements or
oral sworn testimony made by that party which contradict his trial testimony,"
Id.; see also People v. Saez, 69 N.Y.2d 802, 804, 505 N.E.2d 945. 946. 513
N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (1987) (stating that "[a] party may impeach its own witneqs
if such witness' testimony on a material fact tends to disprove the party"s
position or affirmatively damages the party's case") (citations omitted); People
v. Fitzpatrick, 40 N.Y.2d 44, 51, 351 N.E.2d 675, 679, 386 N.Y.S.2d 28, 32
(1976) (stating that impeachment is permitted only when the witness testimony
"affirmatively damages the case of the party calling him.") (footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original); People v. Faulkner, 632 N.Y.S.2d 189, 190 (2d Dep't
1995) (holding that the prosecution could impeach their own witness at trial
with different statements made by the witness to the grand jury because the
testimony satisfied the "tend to disprove" or "affirmatively damage"
requirements).
18. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.35(3) (McKinney 1992). Section
60.35(3) provides:
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introduced to impeach the witness must have been "previously
made either [by] a written statement signed by [a witness] ... or
19
an oral statement under oath contradictory to such testimony."

Moreover, the evidence that is introduced may only be used for
impeachment purposes and cannot be admitted as substantive
evidence. 20 Finally, under early New York common law, the
credibility of one's own witness could be attacked if the court
were to call a witness to the stand or if the individual was a
compulsory witness, for example, a witness to a will. 2 1

When a witness has made a prior signed or sworn statement
contradictory to his testimony in a criminal proceeding upon a matcrial
issue of the case, but his testimony does not tend to disprove the
position of the party who called him and elicited such testimony,
evidence that the witness made such prior statement is not admissible,
and such party may not use such prior statement for the purpose of
refreshing the recollection of the witness in a manner that discloses its
contents to the trier of the facts.
Id.
19. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.35(1).
20. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.35(2) (McKinney 1992). Section
60.35(2) provides:
Evidence concerning a prior contradictory statement introduced pursuant
to subdivision one may be received only for the purpose of impeaching
the credibility of the witness with respect to his testimony upon the
subject, and does not constitute evidence in chief. Upon receiving such
evidence at a jury trial, the court must so instruct the jury.
Id.
21. See In re Will of Bogart, 67 How. Pr. 313 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1884). In
Bogart, the court was faced with a will that had an allegedly faulty attestation
clause because "it omits to state that the witnesses signed at the request of the
testator." Id. at 314. One witness to the faulty clause, called by the proponent,
alleged that he could not state whether or not he would benefit by the will
being rejected. Id. at 314-15. The court allowed the proponent to "ask for a
finding in opposition to [the] uncontradicted testimony" and stated that
"[w]here the law obliges one to call a witness he may be impeached, and a
party is at liberty to contradict the testimony of his own witness, though
indirectly he may be impeached thereby." Id. at 317 (citations omitted); see
also In re Will of Cottrell, 95 N.Y. 335 (1884) (holding that a proponent of a
will may submit evidence that the witness signed the attestation clause of a will
even though such evidence contradicts the proponent's witness who testifies
that he cannot recall whether or not he signed the will).
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The difference between Federal Rule 607 and its New York
counterpart is readily apparent. Under Rule 607, a party is
specifically allowed to attack the credibility of their own witness.
However, under New York law a party is prohibited from
impeaching one's own witness unless the requirements of C.P.L.
section 60.35 are fulfilled.
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